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I do not believe we should face that decision until the Organization of American States has first had the opportunity to declare that it will step into the situation and, second, had the opportunity to take juridical authority over the troops, just as the United Nations did in the Korean conflict, notwithstanding the fact that the preponderance of the troops there were those of the United States.

TRIBUTE TO DR. JAMES E. KIRKLAND, MINISTER, UNION BAPTIST CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to express my pride in the fact that the Acting Chaplain who delivered the prayer in the Senate today was Rev. James E. Kirkland, from the Union Baptist Church of Philadelphia, Pa. Dr. Kirkland is a prominent minister in Pennsylvania. His presence here and the moving and beautiful prayer which he offered are to my mind an event worthy of remembrance for a long time to come.

I am proud of the fact that Dr. Kirkland was here and offered his prayer.

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, on the subject which has been discussed earlier, I rise to express my view concerning Santo Domingo: First and parenthetically, however, I want to say that I am glad the President has asked Congress to authorize \$700 million in appropriations to meet our mounting military requirements in Vietnam. I am glad to have an opportunity to reaffirm my confidence in the policies which the President is pursuing in Vietnam and to express my support of his requests.

As regards Santo Domingo, I agree that it would be fine if the members of the OAS could have acted in concert last week, but they did not so act immediately and could not have acted in time to prevent a disaster. The House of Santo Domingo caught fire. The United States unilaterally went in as a fireman to put out the blaze. Had we waited a matter of hours, in my judgment, the house would have burned down.

In my opinion, we acted as we did, first, to evacuate American personnel and personnel from 30 countries altogether and, second, to prevent a Communist takeover. There is nothing to be ashamed of, or to apologize for, in my opinion, in the fact that we have enlarged the Monroe Doctrine by the addition of a new phase or extension of that policy.

I do not know of any more worthwhile step which the United States can take in the present world situation than to say that we will not permit the establishment of another Communist dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere.

I would be glad to see the OAS take over the responsibility for restoring peace and order to the Dominican Republic but the important thing last week was to move when we did move, with force, with strength, and with determination.

Some columnists assert that the President should support the restoration of President Juan Bosch to power. This has no warrant so far as I can ascertain. It is true that Juan Bosch was legally elected in 1962. It is true that he is in exile. But it is not true that this is his revolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. If the Dominican rebels were really working to restore Juan Bosch to power, why are we now informed that Juan Bosch is resigning and a new man, Francisco Caamano, is acting as alleged President of the Republic or is the actual leader of the rebel forces?

My conclusion is that we moved into the Dominican Republic just in time to prevent a Communist takeover. The rebels are predominantly Communist and Castroite, and their purpose was to create another Cuba. Had we moved as rapidly and effectively in Cuba as we have done in Santo Domingo, Cuba today would not be a Communist country. However, that goes a long way back.

We have served notice on the Western Hemisphere countries that we will cooperate with them, that we prefer to work with them through the common agency of the OAS, but that where there is not enough time for the OAS to act in a rapidly deteriorating situation such as that found in Santo Domingo last week, the United States will move in on behalf of all the free peoples of the Western Hemisphere, and will gladly turn over the peacekeeping responsibility to the OAS as soon as its members are willing to assume that responsibility.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I am glad to yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe that our views are not at all dissimilar, and I wish to be sure that the Senator from Pennsylvania understands me. I supported the President in going into the Dominican Republic.

Mr. SCOTT. I am sure that the Senator did.

Mr. JAVITS. I back the President now in seeking to have the OAS take over. The only slight area of difference which I should like to submit to the Senator from Pennsylvania is that in view of the situation, we do not have to be committed absolutely, now, to saying what we will do if the OAS does not act. That could well be another stage of decision on our part.

Mr. SCOTT. I understand the views of the Senator from New York.

Mr. CLARK addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the situation in the Dominican Republic as of now is certainly confused. I, for one, am not prepared—at least at this moment—to dispute any action of the President in sending massive forces of

the Army and Marine Corps to restore order in that troubled country, and to make sure that there is no danger of a Communist takeover.

However, I must express grave reservations as to the wisdom of our present posture. In view of the comments which have been made by my two colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a column written by Walter Lippmann which was published in the Washington Post within the last few days on this subject.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR DOMINICAN INTERVENTION

(By Walter Lippmann)

The crucial point in the Dominican affair is that the decision to rescue Americans and other foreigners became almost immediately a decision also to stop the rebellion. The disorders began, said the President on Sunday evening "as a popular democratic revolution committed to democracy and social justice." The purpose of the revolution was to restore the duly elected President, Juan Bosch, who had been deposed in 1963 by reactionary military forces 7 months after taking office. "But, the revolutionary movement took a tragic turn."

A number of Communists trained in Cuba "took increasing control . . . many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies because they had been superseded by other evil forces, and the secretary general of the rebel government, Martinez Francisco, appealed for a cease-fire. But he was ignored. The revolution was now in other and dangerous hands."

In the state of the emergency, there was no time for a thorough investigation of all the facts. President Johnson took his decision to halt the rebellion on what, it seems to me, was the right ground.

It was that, if the Communists in the revolutionary forces took over the government, the result would be for all practical purposes irreversible. There would never be another election while they were in power in Santo Domingo. On the other hand, while the Bosch restoration has been halted, the way is still open to the return of the party which won the 1965 elections. By acting promptly and decisively the President has kept the way open as otherwise it might well have been closed forever.

It is quite plain from the President's speech that the United States does not want to see a restoration of the old reactionary regime and that it does want the kind of popular democratic revolution, committed to "democracy and social justice" which President Bosch represents.

It is a question whether a country like the Dominican Republic can find stability somewhere in the center between the extreme left and the extreme right. Cuba did not find this stability. There was nothing, it turned out, between Batista and Castro. Is there in the Dominican Republic something between the corrupt and cruel dictatorship of Trujillo and a Communist dictatorship, like Castro's, which would be far to the left of President Bosch?

If President Johnson, working with the OAS, can help the Dominicans find that something in between, can restore President Bosch and shore him up while he carries through the drastic reforms which are necessary in order to extirpate the evils of Trujillo, evils that breed communism, it will be a bright day for the American republics.

We must not think it is impossible to do this. Mexico has found the middle way.

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There are new currents flowing in this hemisphere, most notably in Chile and Brazil. They flow toward the center, from the left in Chile and from the right in Brazil.

Our intervention in the Caribbean island will, of course, be looked upon all over the world in the context of our intervention in southeast Asia. We need to consider it ourselves in this context.

We must start from the basic fact that what we have done is literally forbidden by article 15 of the Charter of the OAS—"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State."

How then can we defend and justify ourselves? Shall we do it on the ground that the United States is the global policeman, or the global fire department, appointed to stop communism everywhere? After such a plea the best we could hope for even from our best friends is that they will smile indulgently at our innocent self-righteousness. The addicts of the global and crusading theory should ask themselves how many more Vietnams and Dominican Republics they are prepared and able to police.

The other ground, which is the one I take, is the old-fashioned and classical diplomatic ground that the Dominican Republic lies squarely within the sphere of influence of the United States, and that it is normal, not abnormal, for a great power to insist that within its sphere of influence, no other great power shall exercise hostile military and political force.

Since we emerged from isolation in the beginning of this century, American foreign policy has been bedeviled by the utopian fallacy that because this is one world, special spheres of influence are an inherent evil and obsolete. Wilson proclaimed this globalism. Franklin Roosevelt, under the prodding of Cordell Hull, adhered to it against Churchill's better judgment. And Johnson continues to invoke it without, I think, a sufficient study of it.

As a matter of fact, experience must soon verify the truth that spheres of influence are fundamental in the very nature of international society. They are as much a fact of life as are birth and death. Great powers will resist the invasion of their spheres of influence. The Soviet Union did that in Hungary, France did it recently in Gabon, the British have always done it when the Low Countries were attacked, the United States has done it in the Dominican Republic. And, if and when we want to know and face the truth, how much of what China is doing is something very similar?

Recognition of spheres of influence is a true alternative to globalism. It is the alternative to Communist globalism which proclaims a universal revolution. It is the alternative to anti-Communist globalism which promises to fight anti-Communist wars everywhere. The acceptance of spheres of influence has been the diplomatic foundation of the detente in Europe between the Soviet Union and the West. Eventually, it will provide the formula of coexistence between Red China and the United States.

Mr. CLARK. I should like to ask my friends on the other side of the aisle—and some on this side of the aisle—whether we have abandoned permanently or only temporarily our support for the rule of law and our determination to respect solemn treaty commitments entered into with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Let me quote from Mr. Lippmann's article:

We must start from the basic fact that what we have done is literally forbidden by article 15 of the charter of the OAS: "No

state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state."

Mr. President, as one who believes deeply in the rule of law, I should like to listen to some of the fine constitutional lawyers in the Senate give some justification for our taking unilateral action in moving into the Dominican Republic without prior consultation with our partners in the OAS.

Perhaps the protection of American lives justified our action, but I wonder how "hard" is the intelligence on which we are relying in our basic assumption that a Communist takeoff in the Dominican Republic was imminent and could not have been prevented had we waited as long as 48 or 72 hours to comply with the procedures which we were honor-bound under the treaty to follow.

Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD two extremely closely reasoned, calm, and intelligent columns which were published in the New York Times this morning, one entitled "Washington: The Johnson Doctrine," written by James Reston, and the other "Foreign Affairs: Back to Broad Principles," written by C. L. Sulzberger.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, May 5, 1965]

WASHINGTON: THE JOHNSON DOCTRINE
(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, May 4.—The change in the fortunes of the Johnson administration is startling. At the beginning of the new term, less than 4 months ago, it was concentrating on the home front, and now it is back in the ruck of the cold war.

From the war on poverty to the war in Vietnam, from the Alliance for Progress to the Marines in the Dominican Republic, from common action and collective security to unilateral military force—this has been the melancholy direction of events in the last 120 days.

So swift has been this transformation that it is necessary to pause and review the scene. At the beginning of the year, the President was determined not to go north in Vietnam but went. His principal hope was to concentrate on the development of the Great Society, but he was diverted. His formula for unifying the alliance was common consultation and, if possible, common action on common problems, but now he is carrying greater burdens with less help from the allies than ever before.

GO IT ALONE

The Johnson way is changing the use of American power to a significant degree. He is using military power faster now. He is still limiting his retaliatory military moves, but he now seems more ready to go it alone than in the first year of his Presidency.

Last year, he talked a lot about being in Vietnam to help the Vietnamese help themselves; now he is treating Vietnam as a vital national interest to be defended at any cost.

It is not clear whether this represents a carefully calculated change of emphasis, or merely a series of personal Johnsonian responses to increased Communist pressures, but there is at least a change of emphasis.

He has gone back to the Monroe Doctrine in dealing with the uprising in the Dominican Republic. The basic principle of the Organization of American States is that "no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason

whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. . . ."

After a year of disappointing efforts to get effective cooperation from the allies, however, the President acted first on reports that he faced another Communist conquest in the Caribbean and consulted later.

Moreover, Mr. Johnson's long comments on the Vietnamese crisis today indicates that the Johnson doctrine is to apply the Monroe Doctrine not only in this hemisphere but in other parts of the world threatened by Communist power.

The Communist aim in Vietnam, he said, is to show that the "American commitment is worthless. Once that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest. . . . There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. . . ."

This goes a step or two beyond the Truman Doctrine. Mr. Truman agreed that the United States could not allow changes in the status quo by coercion or subterfuge, but emphasized that the aid should be in concert with others and should be primarily financial and economic. Mr. Johnson seems to be saying that the United States must take on the burden alone if necessary.

THE DEEPENING COMMITMENT

This is a bold and may be a realistic appraisal of the problem, but it is a somber prospect and the Nation should be clear about what it implies. The administration's emphasis has now shifted from a revolutionary situation to a military situation, and from collective action by the allies to unilateral military action, if necessary, by the United States.

The trend in Vietnam, moreover, is shifting toward larger commitments of American ground troops, and while the offer of a negotiated settlement remains, the political commitment to fight the battle out to an honorable settlement, if necessary, is stronger than ever.

This impression may be misleading, because the President is now talking out off the cuff on these delicate matters, but the more he talks the more he is obliged to make his actions fit his words, and to respond even more to whatever tactics and strategy the Communists use against him.

STEPPED-UP ACTIVITY

As he says, the pace of Communist activity is increasing. They have the power to create disorder, not only in Vietnam and in Santo Domingo, but in many other places. In fact, Mr. Johnson told the congressional leaders that his intelligence reports indicated the likelihood of another uprising in another place this week but he didn't say where.

If this is what we are facing the need is not going to be for less emphasis on common action by the allies to meet the common danger but for more, for the Johnson doctrine, if carried out, could require more marines than the President has under his command.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: BACK TO BROAD PRINCIPLES (By C. L. Sulzberger)

WASHINGTON.—During the 20 years since World War II the United States has elaborated several foreign policy doctrines and the nub of his latest speech may yet be known as the Johnson doctrine. The Johnson doctrine is simply that any country can have any kind of revolution it wants, but if such occurs in the Americas and has communist dictatorship as its aim, hemispheric action is called for. For "hemispheric" read "United States."

PHILOSOPHICALLY LINKED

Such a flat commitment resembles other regional commitments made under the highly successful Truman doctrine, which protected Greece and Turkey, and the highly unsuccessful Eisenhower doctrine, which failed to line up the Arabs with us against the Soviet

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Union. There is no fundamental difference between the policies regionally expressed in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson doctrines. All relate to a philosophical pledge made by President Truman on March 12, 1949, when he told Congress:

"It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

The trouble comes when broad concepts are abandoned. Mr. Truman didn't endorse ideological holy wars. His promise, indeed, would be equally valid against aggressive fascism as against aggressive communism. Today it would apply as well to threatened Malaysia as to threatened South Vietnam.

The Johnson doctrine rephrases with unnecessary ideological exactitude previous U.S. policy for Latin America. It errs by limiting its application to communistic dictatorship and by specifying hemispheric action. Current events in the Dominican Republic indicate how hard it is to ascertain that a revolution is indeed Communist led, and also how hard it is to muster swift hemispheric action.

Presidential doctrines beg trouble if they are too narrowly precise. The United States essentially wants to protect its own vital interests and to safeguard global peace, when possible, by limiting or preventing any kind of aggression. The U.N. Charter gives sufficient justification for such an approach; there is no reason to embarrass our future actions by being needlessly specific.

When General Eisenhower composed his final report as NATO commander he asked me to read it and suggest changes. I proposed he amend references to Communist threats in favor of Soviet imperialist or "outside" aggression. Eisenhower agreed. Later, however, the original phraseology was restored. The General's advisers thought his report would thereby have more political appeal in a year when he was running for President.

Our business is neither ideological warfare nor the rigid maintenance of any status quo. Our business is to protect our own national interests from any threat, regardless of its philosophical label, and to try and see that changes in an everchanging world are sufficiently controlled to avoid excessively dangerous explosions. We must get this fact straight.

MATURING CREED

Communism, as a creed, is maturing rapidly. Today there are many kinds of communism, some of which, such as Marshal Tito's certainly do not seem to threaten us. Russia, China, Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania are all at odds in one or another respect. In Vietnam it is not at all clear just what the relations are between Peiping, Hanoi, Moscow, and the Vietcong partisans.

During his first years as Secretary of State, Foster Dulles made the mistake of condemning all communism, some socialism, and even neutralism. Obviously it is not in our national interest to publish blanket condemnations and to advertise blanket ideological commitments.

A FLEXIBLE POLICY

If we keep insisting that any variety of communism is automatically our enemy, we risk two consequences. Support for our policies will diminish among our allies who have less interest than ourselves in "holy wars." And, still more important, such an inflexible outlook will push centrifugal communism back upon itself. It is not sensible policy to encourage quarreling opponents to reunite.

Instead we should stick to fundamentals—defend our vital interests; help those of our friends who feel themselves threatened, attacked, or undermined, and work to preserve a peace that is always at best tenuous. Under the U.N. Charter, under our alliance

commitments registered in the U.N., and under widely understood principles of our global policy, this is enough. No limiting precisions are required.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, let me say again, as I began, that I am not prepared certainly at this time either to desert the President or to fail to support him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for not in excess of 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I hope very much that we can get the OAS in on a multilateral basis, just as we went into Korea, and that that organization, with our help, will be able to reestablish law and order; and that there may be, in due course, a government installed in the Dominican Republic which represents the desires of the people of that country and not another military junta which would merely restore a dictatorship which, in due course, might not be so very much different from that of Dictator Trujillo.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. CLARK. I wish to move to another subject at this time, if my friend and colleague will permit me. We are now in the morning hour, and if any Senator desires time to ask me a question, I shall be happy to yield to him at that time.

UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES AND POWER REALITIES

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an excellent speech delivered by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, at the banquet of the American Society of International Law on April 23, 1965, may be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks. It is entitled "United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: The International Apportionment Problem."

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES AND POWER REALITIES: THE INTERNATIONAL APPORTIONMENT PROBLEM

(Address by Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, at the annual banquet of the American Society of International Law, at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., Friday, Apr. 23, 1965)

I have always looked forward to annual meetings of this society with anticipation—but never more so than this year. One reason, of course, is the very great honor of participating in this evening's program together with the Secretary of State. The other reason is the particularly timely and important theme to which you are devoting these annual meetings, "The Development of International Law by International Organizations."

Some people, to be sure, may have reservations about the decision to devote all of our meetings this year to this particular subject.

On one side, there are those who may feel that the problems of international organizations are not sufficiently legal to sustain the interest of practicing lawyers and law teachers.

On the other side, there are those who may feel that law and lawyers already have too much to do with foreign policy, in the field of international organizations and elsewhere, and that this program of yours is hardly designed to keep them in their place.

Those who hold this latter view would probably agree with the judgment of Sir Harold Nicholson, the famous British writer on diplomacy, that "the worst kind of diplomats are missionaries, fanatics, and lawyers."

Fortunately, Sir Harold Nicholson's view on this subject has not prevailed in the United States. Since 1789, 45 out of 52 of our Secretaries of State have been members of the bar. One member of that small band of seven who have not been lawyers—the Secretary of State we honor here tonight—does not conceal the fact that he was studying law when the war intervened. It cut off what undoubtedly would have been a brilliant career at the bar—and it no doubt made him Secretary of State several years sooner.

My views on this subject are undoubtedly self-serving. I am a great believer in the deep involvement of lawyers in foreign policy, particularly in the field of international organization. Those laymen who complain about the lawyer's role in this area tend to think of law as the mechanical application of principles found in cases and textbooks. Few lawyers today would accept so restrictive a definition of their function. Most of us like to think of ourselves as practicing what a colleague on the Harvard law faculty has described as "Economics—the science of good arrangements."

It is not surprising that in the Department of State today there are many more lawyers outside than inside the Legal Adviser's Office. Several, like myself, are in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, trying to apply "the science of good arrangements" to the major tasks of peacekeeping and nation-building which our country is undertaking on a multilateral basis.

Together with our colleagues in the Office of the Legal Adviser, we have been applying the lawyer's skills in problem solving to some of the exciting enterprises undertaken during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations—to developing the institutional components for partial and general disarmament; to negotiating ground rules for U.N. peacekeeping forces; to drafting principles for the peaceful uses of outer space; to establishing interim arrangements for global satellite communications; to inaugurating a UN/FAO world food program; to creating a world weather watch under the World Meteorological Organization; to launching new United Nations trade machinery; and to analysis of the possible functions of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

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Of all our preoccupations these last 4 years in the field of international organization the one which best illustrates the relevance of law and legal skills has been our effort to adapt the decisionmaking procedures of the United Nations and its family of agencies to take adequate account of world power realities.

The Secretary of State himself called special attention to this problem in his Hamarskjold lecture at Columbia University on January 10, 1964. He pointed out that a two-thirds vote could now be put together in the General Assembly, at least in theory, by members representing only 10 percent of the population of U.N. members and 5 percent of contributions to the regular budget. He noted that the rapid and radical expansion of the organization may require some adapta-

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tion of procedures if the U.N. is to remain relevant to the real world and therefore effective in that world.

The reason for our preoccupation with this subject is obvious. The United Nations has grown from 51 to 114 members in the last 20 years. A parallel increase has taken place in the membership of the specialized and affiliated agencies. U.N. membership may reach a total of 125 to 130 before it finally levels off.

What makes this extraordinary increase in membership particularly significant from a constitutional point of view is the simultaneous increase in the U.N.'s capacity to act. The United States has played a leading role in the strengthening of the action responsibilities of the United Nations system in both peacekeeping and development. We want to continue to play this role in the years ahead.

It is obvious that, as the U.N. develops an increasing capacity to act, there will be increasing concern with the procedures by which this capacity is exercised. The manifest disproportion between voting power and real power is now a central preoccupation of persons concerned with the future of the world organization. Unless we can find ways to allay the anxieties felt on this subject in the United States and in other countries, it will be increasingly difficult to use the U.N. in the years ahead for important tasks of peacekeeping and development.

To be sure, it is important not to overstate the problem which is inherent in the present constitutional situation. As Dag Hammarskjöld reminded us some years ago in an annual report to the General Assembly, the members of the United Nations may have equal votes, but they are far from having equal influence: "The criticism of 'one nation, one vote,' irrespective of size or strength, as constituting an obstacle to arriving at just and representative solutions, tends to exaggerate the problem. The General Assembly is not a parliament of elected individual members; it is a diplomatic meeting in which the delegates of member states represent governmental policies, and these policies are subject to all the influences that would prevail in international life in any case."

Anyone who believes that U.S. influence in the United Nations is measured by the fact that it has less than one-hundredth of the votes in the General Assembly fails completely to understand the realities of power as they are reflected in the world organization. These realities include the fact that the United States is the principal contributor to the U.N.'s regular budget, is by far the largest supporter of the U.N.'s peacekeeping and development programs, and is making by far the largest individual contribution to the defense and development of the non-Communist world. On U.N. decisions of vital importance to the United States, the voting of other countries has been considerably influenced by U.S. views.

Nevertheless, after these and other qualifications are made, it remains true that the present procedures do need to be improved in the light both of the growth of U.N. membership and the growth of U.N. responsibilities. The last UNESCO Conference, for example, voted a budget by a large majority of votes which represented less than 30 percent of the funds that had to be raised to make the budget a reality. And at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva last spring there was a disturbing tendency of the 75 (now 77) less developed countries to use their automatic two-thirds majority to vote recommendations for action in trade and development over the opposition of the very minority of developed countries to whom the recommendations were addressed.

On the whole, the majority of small countries have not behaved as irresponsibly as the pessimists have predicted. We hope in the years ahead that the "revolution of rising

expectations" will be matched by an "evolution of rising responsibility." But we cannot base our participation in the U.N. on hope alone. Sound procedural adaptations can help make this hope a reality.

The constitutional problem here involved is not unique to the U.N. We have sometimes referred to these difficulties in the U.N. as the "international apportionment problem"—because the word apportionment has a very poignant meaning in our domestic political life through the recent actions of our Supreme Court and State legislatures.

Indeed, we are dealing here with problems in the management of power reminiscent of those which confronted our own Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia nearly 200 years ago. In Philadelphia then, as in the United Nations system today, the problem was how to reconcile the sovereign equality of States with the fact that some States are very small and other States are very large.

The sovereign equality of states is one of the fundamental principles of international law. In the words of a famous case decided many years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court: "Russia and Geneva have equal rights." Article 2, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter declares that the United Nations is based on the principle of sovereign equality.

The sovereign equality of states, however, has never meant the equal right to participate in the decisionmaking process of international organizations. The composition of the Security Council and other councils, the veto provision, the amendment process—these and other provisions of the charter all accord special privileges to certain members. So the structure of the United Nations from the very beginning recognized the need to reconcile the principle of sovereign equality with the uneven disposition of real power and real responsibility for implementing U.N. decisions. Appropriate means of balancing these considerations were also incorporated in the constitutions of the specialized agencies.

Quite apart from charter provisions, procedures have been developed over the years to adapt decisionmaking procedures to power realities. In the last several years this central problem has occasioned a vast amount of staff work in our own and other governments—and a considerable amount of discussion and negotiation in the U.N. system.

We have explored with other nations many different procedures for rationalizing the decisionmaking process. We recognize that no one procedure is appropriate for all cases.

Certain procedures may be appropriate for the voting of General Assembly resolutions which merely manifest the views of members and have no binding legal effect.

Other procedures may be appropriate when the General Assembly is exercising its mandatory power to assess.

Still other procedures may be appropriate in specialized agencies lending substantial sums of money for exchange stabilization or economic development.

So our search for adequate procedures has been undertaken on a case-by-case basis with special regard for the peculiarities of each case.

Before turning to a discussion of possible procedures, it may be useful to identify one solution to the problem which we have not considered. We have rejected the notion that most or all important U.N. operations should be subject to the "principle of unanimity."

Specifically, we have rejected the 20-year-old Soviet demand that all peacekeeping operations of the U.N. should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council and thus subject to great power veto. While recognizing that the Security Council has the exclusive right to initiate mandatory peacekeeping actions that impose binding obligations on states, we have consis-

tently recognized the residual authority of the General Assembly to launch voluntary peacekeeping operations. We have defended the charter power of the Assembly to assess the membership for such operations—while recognizing that in practice many peacekeeping operations can be more appropriately financed by methods other than by every-member assessment.

Some Americans, I know, feel strongly that we must not expose the vital interests of the United States to the possibility that the Assembly would lay mandatory obligations on us against our will. Fears have been expressed that the United Nations would send a force into some area against our political opposition—and make us pay for such ventures besides. It has been suggested that in the arrears issue we are trying to enforce on the U.S.S.R. and France a principle that we would never allow to be enforced against ourselves.

There are several important points to be considered in connection with this assertion. The Congo and Middle East operations were launched with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union and France. The General Assembly has never recommended any peacekeeping operation against the negative vote of a big power. Indeed, the Assembly has only recommended a peacekeeping operation once, the United Nations Emergency Force, and this was with the consent of the territorial sovereign.

The Assembly cannot, in any case, initiate binding enforcement action requiring members to contribute men and logistical support to military operations. It has never attempted to do this—and there is no reason to suppose it ever will. Moreover, the Assembly, indeed the U.N., is estopped by article 2, paragraph 7 of the charter from unlawful intervention in matters within a member's domestic jurisdiction.

Finally, in the light of the article 19 experience, it is clear that the Assembly will be very cautious in the future in exercising its right to initiate and assess for voluntary peacekeeping operations. These considerations are usually overlooked by those who claim that the principle for which the United States has been contending in the article 19 crisis is incompatible with our national interests.

The argument that, if we were like the Soviet Union, we would not want to pay for peacekeeping operations we oppose, is unpersuasive for another reason: The policies we pursue do not lead the United Nations to undertake peacekeeping actions directed against what we see as our vital interests. If the United States were engaged in promoting the overthrow of foreign governments and institutions, it would have reason to fear the effective implementation of United Nations principles.

But, in view of what in fact American principles and purposes are, we have every reason to uphold the authority of the United Nations. We have every reason to uphold the law, as the International Court of Justice has found it to be. We have every reason to favor impartially applying the law of the charter, for we have no reason to fear impartial application of that law. If we seek a world ruled by law rather than force, we naturally must seek to apply and defend the law we now have.

In short, the United States has been prepared to take whatever risks are inherent in the principle that voluntary peacekeeping operations may be initiated and financed by the General Assembly free from great-power veto because we recognize a long-term interest in developing this means of containing violence in the nuclear age. We want to minimize these risks, of course, but not at the cost of crippling the capacity of the United Nations to act for peace and security.

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difficulty in making up my mind as to whether to support the request or not.

I have no doubt that the Senator from New York did not spring to the immediate conviction that he should support the request.

I should like to feel that I could support it. However, what is the difference between voting for a \$700 million appropriation and voting for a declaration of war? Would it not be better to be candid and ask for a declaration of war?

Mr. JAVITS. That is the substance of what I am saying. If the \$700 million requested is a means of backing up the judgment of the President, or even backing up a preparation to do more, if the national judgment should be that we should do more—and I would never wish to be hampered by the fact that we were not forehanded in preparation—I think that is very different from a command decision actually to involve ground combat troops.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I respectfully suggest to the Senator that if we could have that assurance from the President—that there would be such a request, if there were any design to make that command decision—then I believe that we should vote for this much.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, does the Senator not feel that we are actually engaged in a war against North Vietnam right now and that if we became engaged in war, we would send our airplanes up there?

Mr. JAVITS. I would say not. I think the doctrine of hot pursuit in international law, and the presence of American forces there which gives rise to a primary obligation to provide them security, make our North Vietnamese operation such, in my judgment, as not to warrant being characterized as a state of war.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator be willing to tell me whether the engagement with the North Vietnamese and Chinese airplanes was a part of the hot pursuit doctrine to which the Senator referred?

Mr. JAVITS. We were hotly pursuing the suppliers of the Vietcong personnel along ground routes which could best be reached without ground action. If we brought the action into North Vietnamese territory, then I think we might have, for practical purposes, a different situation. I would not regard the North Vietnamese action as creating a condition of war.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the majority leader does not object, may I ask unanimous consent to have 10 additional minutes? It will not take that long.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I close the colloquy by expressing intense admiration, as I have for many years, for the astute ability of the Senator from New York as a constitutional lawyer with respect to the war powers of Congress and the President.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator recall that the bombing of North Vietnam followed the Pleiku incident? Does he indicate that was a hot pursuit course of action?

Mr. JAVITS. In the Pleiku incident we actually bombarded sources of supply of torpedo boats that had attacked our vessels in international waters. The precedent for that goes back to the days of Tripoli. I think we were on sounder ground there. We were on most traditional grounds there.

Mr. GRUENING. I think the Senator confuses Tonkin Bay with Pleiku.

Mr. JAVITS. Yes; I meant Tonkin Bay.

Mr. GRUENING. Pleiku is back about 200 miles from the northern border. Pleiku is on the 14th parallel. The northern boundary is on the 17th parallel. The material used by the South Vietnamese at Pleiku was not derived from the North Vietnamese, but was American material—a mortar—manufactured in the United States. Is that hot pursuit?

Mr. JAVITS. I agree with the Senator in the identification of the two incidents. I was thinking about Tonkin Bay. What I said applied only to Tonkin Bay.

As to the Pleiku incident, that involved the jeopardy of American personnel and involved supplies—whether food, munitions, or volunteers—to forces engaged in jeopardizing the security of our own personnel.

I do not believe the identification of materiel as North Vietnamese or our own represents a vital difference between the Pleiku incident and the general situations to which the doctrine of hot pursuit applies.

Mr. GRUENING. The only point I wish to make and wish to impress on the Senate, following the remarks of the distinguished Senator from New York that the bombing of North Vietnam was not hot pursuit and that the Pleiku incident in no way involved hot pursuit; that the Tonkin incident took place in August, whereas the North Vietnam bombing began the following February. It seems to me that the Senator used the Pleiku incident as a justification for the hot pursuit and there was not direct connection between it and North Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague for his clarification. The Tonkin Bay incident took place in August, and the Pleiku incident was at another time.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, addressing myself now to the situation in the Dominican Republic, it seems to me that we are on extremely clear ground with

respect to the U.S. position in the Dominican Republic so long as we are engaged in protecting our own and foreign nationals. That is a very different situation from the matter of holding off or preventing a Communist takeover.

It seems to me that, in the latter respect, our troops should act only in an interim custodial capacity, as trustees for the Inter-American system. Now that the Organization of American States is seized of this matter and is giving it consideration, it seems to me the answer is for the OAS to assume juridical authority over our troops and any other troops that may be sent in by member countries of the Organization of American States. The relationship of the OAS to United States and other foreign forces in the Dominican Republic should be analogous to the relationship between the United Nations and the forces we had in Korea.

It seems to me that even if necessity requires that our own Armed Forces be by far the most numerous, jurisdiction by the Organization of American States is extremely important. Although American forces may remain under American command, the OAS should have juridical authority over them, and whether they stayed or withdrew would depend on the OAS.

It is on behalf of the Inter-American system that the U.S. action was taken, and it is in accordance with the legal organs of that system, which are indispensable for the future of the Americas, that we should continue to act. If we take the attitude I have described, namely, that the reason why we were forced to assume unilateral responsibility by sending in our troops was creditable because the OAS was unable to act promptly and we wished to prevent a Communist takeover, our good faith will be demonstrated. If the OAS does not take on this responsibility, we shall be faced with a historic choice which could materially affect our relations with the other American states. If we should exercise our choice and say that we will do without the OAS to prevent a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic, it will be the first time we have asserted the right to unilateral military intervention based on a clear and present danger of a Communist takeover in this hemisphere.

Such an important shift in this country's "Good Neighbor" policy would require clear justification, more justification than we have at present; and the evidence to justify it is not fully in yet. Only as the situation develops over the next few days or weeks can we come to a clear conclusion as to whether the situation presents a clear and present danger of a Communist takeover, and that we have no alternative but to stay in.

I hope that the President will make it clear that our troops are there, until the OAS acts, in a custodial character, to prevent a taking over that would be irremediable and could not be repelled by the Organization of American States, which is the recognized authority for such a situation, and that the United States has not yet made a decision to proceed unilaterally.

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I do not believe we should face that decision until the Organization of American States has first had the opportunity to declare that it will step into the situation and, second, had the opportunity to take juridical authority over the troops, just as the United Nations did in the Korean conflict, notwithstanding the fact that the preponderance of the troops there were those of the United States.

TRIBUTE TO DR. JAMES E. KIRKLAND, MINISTER, UNION BAPTIST CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to express my pride in the fact that the Acting Chaplain who delivered the prayer in the Senate today was Rev. James E. Kirkland, from the Union Baptist Church of Philadelphia, Pa. Dr. Kirkland is a prominent minister in Pennsylvania. His presence here and the moving and beautiful prayer which he offered are to my mind an event worthy of remembrance for a long time to come.

I am proud of the fact that Dr. Kirkland was here and offered his prayer.

SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, on the subject which has been discussed earlier, I rise to express my view concerning Santo Domingo. First and parenthetically, however, I want to say that I am glad the President has asked Congress to authorize \$700 million in appropriations to meet our mounting military requirements in Vietnam. I am glad to have an opportunity to reaffirm my confidence in the policies which the President is pursuing in Vietnam and to express my support of his requests.

As regards Santo Domingo, I agree that it would be fine if the members of the OAS could have acted in concert last week, but they did not so act immediately and could not have acted in time to prevent a disaster. The House of Santo Domingo caught fire. The United States unilaterally went in as a fireman to put out the blaze. Had we waited a matter of hours, in my judgment, the house would have burned down.

In my opinion, we acted as we did, first, to evacuate American personnel and personnel from 30 countries altogether and, second, to prevent a Communist takeover. There is nothing to be ashamed of, or to apologize for, in my opinion, in the fact that we have enlarged the Monroe Doctrine by the addition of a new phase or extension of that policy.

I do not know of any more worthwhile step which the United States can take in the present world situation than to say that we will not permit the establishment of another Communist dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere.

I would be glad to see the OAS take over the responsibility for restoring peace and order to the Dominican Republic but the important thing last week was to move when we did move, with force, with strength, and with determination.

Some columnists assert that the President should support the restoration of President Juan Bosch to power. This has no warrant so far as I can ascertain. It is true that Juan Bosch was legally elected in 1962. It is true that he is in exile. But it is not true that this is his revolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. If the Dominican rebels were really working to restore Juan Bosch to power, why are we now informed that Juan Bosch is resigning and a new man, Francisco Caamaño, is acting as alleged President of the Republic or is the actual leader of the rebel forces?

My conclusion is that we moved into the Dominican Republic just in time to prevent a Communist takeover. The rebels are predominantly Communist and Castroite, and their purpose was to create another Cuba. Had we moved as rapidly and effectively in Cuba as we have done in Santo Domingo, Cuba today would not be a Communist country. However, that goes a long way back.

We have served notice on the Western Hemisphere countries that we will cooperate with them, that we prefer to work with them through the common agency of the OAS, but that where there is not enough time for the OAS to act in a rapidly deteriorating situation such as that found in Santo Domingo last week, the United States will move in on behalf of all the free peoples of the Western Hemisphere, and will gladly turn over the peacekeeping responsibility to the OAS as soon as its members are willing to assume that responsibility.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. SCOTT. I am glad to yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I believe that our views are not at all dissimilar, and I wish to be sure that the Senator from Pennsylvania understands me. I supported the President in going into the Dominican Republic.

Mr. SCOTT. I am sure that the Senator did.

Mr. JAVITS. I back the President now in seeking to have the OAS take over. The only slight area of difference which I should like to submit to the Senator from Pennsylvania is that in view of the situation, we do not have to be committed absolutely, now, to anything that we will do if the OAS does not act. That could well be another stage of decision on our part.

Mr. SCOTT. I understand the views of the Senator from New York.

Mr. CLARK addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the situation in the Dominican Republic as of now is certainly confused. I, for one, am not prepared—at least at this moment—to dispute any action of the President in sending massive forces of

the Army and Marine Corps to restore order in that troubled country, and to make sure that there is no danger of a Communist takeover.

However, I must express grave reservations as to the wisdom of our present posture. In view of the comments which have been made by my two colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a column written by Walter Lippmann which was published in the Washington Post within the last few days on this subject.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

OUR DOMINICAN INTERVENTION

(By Walter Lippmann)

The crucial point in the Dominican affair is that the decision to rescue Americans and other foreigners became almost immediately a decision also to stop the rebellion. The disorders began, said the President on Sunday evening "as a popular democratic revolution committed to democracy and social justice." The purpose of the revolution was to restore the duly elected President, Juan Bosch, who had been deposed in 1963 by reactionary military forces 7 months after taking office. "But, the revolutionary movement took a tragic turn."

A number of Communists trained in Cuba "took increasing control . . . many of the original leaders of the rebellion, the followers of President Bosch, took refuge in foreign embassies because they had been superseded by other evil forces, and the secretary general of the rebel government, Martinez Francisco, appealed for a cease-fire. But he was ignored. The revolution was now in other and dangerous hands."

In the state of the emergency, there was no time for a thorough investigation of all the facts. President Johnson took his decision to halt the rebellion on what, it seems to me, was the right ground.

It was that, if the Communists in the revolutionary forces took over the government, the result would be for all practical purposes irreversible. There would never be another election while they were in power in Santo Domingo. On the other hand, while the Bosch restoration has been halted, the way is still open to the return of the party which won the 1962 elections. By acting promptly and decisively the President has kept the way open as otherwise it might well have been closed forever.

It is quite plain from the President's speech that the United States does not want to see a restoration of the old reactionary regime and that it does want the kind of popular democratic revolution, committed to "democracy and social justice" which President Bosch represents.

It is a question whether a country like the Dominican Republic can find stability somewhere in the center between the extremes left and the extreme right. Cuba did not find this stability. There was nothing, it turned out, between Batista and Castro. Is there in the Dominican Republic something between the corrupt and cruel dictatorship of Trujillo and a Communist dictatorship, like Castro's, which would be far to the left of President Bosch?

If President Johnson, working with the OAS, can help the Dominicans find that something in between, can restore President Bosch and shore him up while he carries through the drastic reforms which are necessary in order to extirpate the evils of Trujillo, evils that breed communism, it will be a bright day for the American republic.

We must not think it is impossible to do this. Mexico has found the middle way.

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Tell it to the American people. They will give you their answer, if that is your position, Mr. President.

I am satisfied that the overwhelming majority of the American people will repudiate you if that is what you are willing to do.

Mr. President, I have already covered the point about having offered to negotiate for peace without conditions, but we did not offer to negotiate for peace without conditions because the Johns Hopkins speech is not subject to that interpretation. The President continues to say that he is willing to go anywhere, anytime, to negotiate, but he is talking about bilateral negotiations. I am talking about multilateral negotiations, with a third party force at the head of the table.

I have been heard to discuss many times in the Senate our violation of the Geneva Accords.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Oregon has expired.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Oregon is recognized for 5 additional minutes.

VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA ACCORD TO BE FINANCED WITH THIS MONEY

Mr. MORSE. Let me quickly point out that the Geneva accords did not set up a government in South Vietnam. The President keeps telling the American people that we went into South Vietnam in answer to an invitation from a government of South Vietnam. But no sovereign government for either north or south was provided for in the 1954 agreement. It was a puppet government of the United States, set up by the United States that became the Government of South Vietnam. We took a South Vietnamese named Diem out of New York, sent him to South Vietnam, militarized him, financed him, and supported him, and then used him as our stooge for the while that we are in South Vietnam on the basis of an invitation from the Government of South Vietnam.

Mr. President, that is as much a Government of South Vietnam free of the United States, as the Government of East Germany is free of Russia. Both are puppet governments. All we have done in South Vietnam is to pattern ourselves after Russia in East Germany. That is shocking. However, history will record its truth.

Mr. President, we talk about democracy in South Vietnam, but the United States has been the major force in preventing democracy in South Vietnam.

The Geneva accords created two zones, with an artificial line drawn at the 17th parallel. It was provided in the accords that in 1956 free supervised elections be held in both zones, which would provide for reunification of North and South Vietnam, and for the election by self-determination of officials of the government. That is what the Geneva accords provide. The United States, of course, refused to sign them and persuaded its puppet, Diem, not to sign them either. Yet the President keeps

saying that we are in South Vietnam because the Geneva accords are being violated.

Being violated by whom? By the Communists? Yes, by the Communists—and also by the United States and South Vietnam.

We are all tarred with the same brush in regard to violations of the Geneva accords. However, one of the saddest chapters in the sordid history of the United States in South Vietnam is that it prevented the election in 1956.

How well I remember, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, sitting through the briefings of our intelligence reports in regard to that situation. Thank God I protested at that time. I also protested in 1954 the attempts of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Nixon to get the United States to join in sending American boys into South Vietnam. I protested then, as the RECORD will show, what I considered to be the shocking secret diplomacy of John Foster Dulles, when he went to London and tried to get Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to enter into a secret deal with him, whereby he would pledge American boys, and the British would pledge British boys, and then they would go across the channel and promise the French Government that if France would continue the war, they would support France with American and British troops.

Winston Churchill refused to accept the deal, as Eden points out in his memoirs. Churchill told the Secretary of State of the United States, "Do you not think that would be deceiving the Congress of the United States?"

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Oregon has expired.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Oregon is recognized for 5 additional minutes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in 1954, the American people were not protected by John Foster Dulles. They were protected by the then Prime Minister of England—Winston Churchill—against Dulles' stock in trade, his secret diplomacy, whereby he always came before the Committee on Foreign Relations with an accomplished fact, an agreement into which the United States had entered in secret, and then his plea was, "You cannot let us down. The Government has negotiated it. You cannot let us down."

The Senate must understand why, during the 20 years I have been a Member of the Senate, I have pleaded against government by secrecy in the United States.

Let me say to the American people tonight: "You are already a long way down the road toward control by a government of secrecy."

I wish to return this Government to the checks and balances of the Constitution of the United States. I wish to give some assurance that the secret diplomacy of a Dulles can never rear its ugly head again to endanger the destiny of America.

The United States prevented the elections in South Vietnam. Had those elections been held, what did the intelligence reports show? They showed that the previous American hero, Ho Chi Minh, would have been elected president of both South and North Vietnam in a unified country.

Most Americans do not know the story of Ho Chi Minh. During World War II, he was an American hero. However, he is a Moscow-trained Communist. I hold no respect and no support for this despicable Communist ideology. I do not have to offer any explanation of my position on communism to the Senate. I shall always point with pride to the fact that I am one of the three authors—along with Jack Kennedy, of Massachusetts, and HUBERT HUMPHREY, of Minnesota, in 1954—of the amendment which was passed and became law, outlawing the Communist Party in the United States.

Because I opposed our policies in Asia I must expect—and I am "getting it" from reactionary columnists—to be criticized because I am aiding and abetting communism because I do not believe we can justify, either in theory or in policy, following a unilateral policeman's course of action in seeking to contain communism everywhere in the world.

Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese Moscow-trained Communist, languished for a year in a Chinese prison. He hates Chinese Communists, although we are driving them into his arms. There is not a single country in southeast Asia which is pro-Chinese. The interesting thing is that all the countries in southeast Asia—including South Vietnam which opposed China for 1,000 years—happen to be anti-Chinese. Yet, we follow President Johnson's foreign policy in Asia. We are going to end by unifying them? They will hate us more than they will dislike each other. That is the great challenge which confronts us.

In this resolution are provided the funds for another series of violations of the 1954 Geneva agreement. The President states the money will be used to construct military installations and warehouses, which are illegal under the accord, to maintain U.S. troops whose presence is illegal under the accord, and to buy more aircraft, nearly all of which are illegal if they are anything more modern than what was in use then in 1954.

How can Senators, or the President, talk any more about Communist violations of the agreement, when with this resolution we are formally repudiating it?

Mr. President, there has been great wrong done on both sides, but our hands are not clean. Our hands are not clean, as we lawyers say, in a court of equity. Our hands are not clean in another respect. Our hands are bloody, because we have been conducting a war of outlawry.

Mr. President, I wish to see my country cleanse itself. I wish to see my country change its course of action. It has stood by as an accessory to the violation of the Geneva Treaty for the handling and treatment of war prisoners.

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UNITED STATES VIOLATING RULES OF WARFARE

Did Americans ever believe that they would live to look upon picture of American soldiers in South Vietnam standing by witnessing shocking and heinous personal crimes committed upon the bodies of captured prisoners?

Have any Senators read anywhere or heard anywhere of any protest of the United States to the United Nations in respect to the violation of the Geneva Treaty on the handling of war prisoners? Were not Senators shocked at least a little bit the other day when they read in the United Press dispatch that South Vietnamese soldiers put a length of cloth around the throat of a Vietcong soldier and conducted a tug of war over his throat because he would not squeal and talk?

I thought it was interesting that the United Press dispatch made reference to the fact that U.S. military forces were standing by in silence.

I say, tell the American people the truth. Tell them the truth about our participation in this dirty war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MORSE. I yield myself 2 more minutes.

Tell the American people the truth about our violation of the Geneva accord. Tell the American people the truth about our acts as provocateur in southeast Asia for many years. Tell the American people the truth about what we plan to do in southeast Asia unless the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese and the Red Chinese put their diplomatic tails between their legs and come to a conference of the type referred to by President Johnson in his Johns Hopkins speech, which means, when we analyze his statement, that they must come and surrender.

They have no intention of surrendering, any more than we have.

That is why we must bring in third party efforts under the existing procedures of international law to conduct the negotiations, with the United States and South Vietnam on one side and the Red Chinese and the North Vietnamese on the other side, although as of now only the North Vietnamese would be included. However, Red China should be there, too, because although she has not shown her hand above the board, I am satisfied she is already there working under the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MORSE. I yield myself 1 more minute.

Mr. President, that is my plea. It is unpopular at the present time in the Senate. I suspect that tomorrow two votes will be cast against the joint resolution, namely my vote and the vote of that great Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I shall always be proud to walk in his footsteps on this issue. I believe we can be sure of those two votes. In my prayers tonight, however, I shall pray that other Senators may recognize the facts about our sordid record in southeast Asia before they vote tomorrow, so that there may be more votes against the joint resolution. Whatever

the outcome of the vote, I say to the President and to my colleagues in the Senate: "Your vote tomorrow will not settle this issue so far as American public opinion is concerned, for I am satisfied that American public opinion will eventually hold you to an accounting, and that accounting will be by way of repudiating support of the President's request that you now give him by way of a vote of confidence to conduct and carry on a war of outlawry and an undeclared war in southeast Asia."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MORSE. I yield myself 1 more minute. This is a war that cannot be reconciled with article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and cannot be justified on the ground of the inherent power of the Commander in Chief. That inherent power lasts only so long as it is necessary for him to respond in the interest of meeting an emergency, and he has the clear duty of proceeding as quickly as he can to Congress to ask for a declaration of war.

That the President has not done. I ask him, as I close: "Mr. President, when are you going to do it? When are you going to keep faith with what I consider to be your trust to abide by the Constitution of the United States?"

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I am sure the debate will resume tomorrow. I wish to yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the senior Senator from Oregon made certain comments earlier about the Dominican Republic, particularly about the President taking action without consulting the Organization of American States. It is my understanding that on Tuesday, the 27th of April—

Mr. MORSE. I did not say that. Quite to the contrary. I pointed out that the President is using the OAS. I wanted to know why he was not using the United Nations in Vietnam. He is working through the Organization of American States.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. He tried to work through the Organization of American States prior to sending in the marines. That is my comment.

Mr. MORSE. There is doubt about the time. It was within a few hours, one way or another. I made the point that the Organization of American States has been very much divided and are divided with regard to the course of action that we followed. I pointed out that this will rise to plague us.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I shall not argue with the Senator from Oregon as to what he did or did not say.

It is my understanding that on Tuesday, the 27th of April, our Government notified the Peace Committee and had a discussion with the Peace Committee. No action was taken.

On Wednesday, the 28th, a Council of Ministers meeting was held in the morn-

ing. I believe some discussion was had with the Dominican Ambassador.

Our marines were sent in there in the evening of the 28th, I believe about 9:15 p.m.

The OAS was not notified at that time that they were going to be sent in, because the time was so short.

American civilians, including women and children, were lying on their faces. The Embassy was being shot at.

The Department of State did call the OAS after the marines had been ordered sent in.

I point out that an effort was made to get action through the OAS prior to sending the marines into the Dominican Republic, on the evening of April 28.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION FOR MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 447) making a supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, for military functions of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. The debate will resume tomorrow, I am sure. I must reserve some time for other Senators. By way of a quick summary, I say to the Senator from Oregon that he was brilliant, as always, in his argument. He raised some serious points.

No one can guarantee the future. Certainly the Senator from Mississippi cannot guarantee it.

I feel that unless we appropriate the money requested we shall be giving notice that we are backing out from what we started. To whom would we give that notice? We would be giving it not only to the American people, but also to those who are arrayed against us, the North Vietnamese, the Communist Chinese, and the Communist Russians. This we cannot afford to do. If we are to change our course, we must do it in one way or another, but not by refusing to pass a military appropriation measure to pay for the steel and iron and ammunition and food and all the other things that are needed.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. We would not be backing out if the President, instead of asking us to make the appropriation, were to make it clear that he will lay the issue of southeast Asia before the United Nations.

That would not only be a backing out, but it would be acclaimed around the world. But if the President wishes to follow a warmaking course of action, then rather than ask Congress to support his undeclared war, let him come forth with a recommendation for a declaration of war against North Vietnam, and let Members of Congress then stand up and vote on a clear issue as to whether or not they want to bind this Republic in war. That is the duty of the President. He has two alternatives, and they do not constitute a backing out, no matter which alternative the President takes. But the action would give clear notice as to what the position of the United States really is.

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While this is going on, don't forget the thousands of letters from folks from everywhere in and outside of a Member's district who believe in "writing the Congressman" on everything from Medicare to Vietnam, streets and sewers, bank loans, Government contracts, school loans, and on and on.

One thinks of Lincoln and finds that as long as he tries, his friends understand without explanation, and his opponents never pay attention to facts because their minds are already made up.

One thing you can be sure of—there's never a dull moment for a Congressman who has to campaign every second year.

DANTE ALIGHIERI—POET OF VISION

(Mr. ANNUNZIO (at the request of Mr. BANDSTRA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, the middle of May—the exact date is not known—is the birthday of Dante Alighieri. In order to commemorate the contributions he has made to the arts and to literature, the Postmaster General of the United States has designated a stamp in his honor. The stamp will go on sale in post offices throughout America on July 17. It was designed by Douglas Gorsline, New York City artist who also designed last year's Shakespeare commemorative stamp. Gorsline's design simulates the style of early Florentine allegorical paintings. For his likeness of Dante, the artist turned to the painting of an unknown 16th century artist which hangs in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. Dante is shown wearing the laurel wreath symbolic of poetry. Above him an angel unfurls a banner on which is inscribed "700th Anniversary." Lower left are flames, an allegorical reference to hell, which the poet visited in his poem, "The Divine Comedy."

It is my pleasure to place in the Appendix of the RECORD an editorial which appeared in the Washington Post on Sunday, April 25, 1965. The editorial follows:

POET OF VISION

About the middle of May 1265, in the city of Florence, Dante Alighieri was born, and now, 700 years later, all the world is celebrating the anniversary of his birth. Recently the Catholic University of Washington held a series of lectures and a symposium as "Homage to Dante." On May 1, the Library of Congress will hold another symposium. Before the year is out, colleges and universities throughout the world will pay their tribute to a poet who wrote with vision and wisdom for all men and for all time. Dante is as universal a poet as Shakespeare.

Literate people everywhere know Dante's great poem the "Commedia," which by the 16th century had already attained such fame that men rechristened it "Commedia Divina." It has been called a summation of the learning of the Middle Ages, but it is more than that, for Dante's poem is not a fossil from the past but a vital work with beauty and wisdom for us today.

The author was no cloistered recluse believing in art for art's sake, no long-haired escapee from contemporary problems, no poseur who wrapped the profession of poet around him like a cloak. Dante was a par-

ticipant in the political affairs of his time, and he suffered for his beliefs and actions. In a turn of fortune's wheel, Dante's political faction lost power in Florence and the city exiled him on pain of death. Henceforth Dante was obliged to wander from city to city in Italy, but he continued to combine his literary labors with political debate and action.

Dante dreamed of a united Italy without warring factions, of a whole world of peace and harmony ruled by law. His vision of united nations contemplated a rule of justice under the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. But Dante's dream vanished with the death of the Emperor Henry VII, and peace has remained an illusory hope that poets and others must continue to cherish.

"The Divine Comedy" is not an easy poem to read, for it is filled with learned allusions, historical facts, and theological and philosophical commentary, besides depths of allegorical meaning. Yet Dante is never obscure for obscurity's sake. Unlike third-rate poets, he does not have to hide a poverty of ideas under a mulch of verbiage.

Dante reserves his greatest scorn for fugitives from responsibility, the "lukewarm" who decline to participate in anything. For them he made a dreary place in the vestibule of hell, for hell itself would not have them. There—

"United in a tumult, whirling on
Forever through the air of timeless gloom,
Like sand and borne onward by the circling
wind"

those too cowardly to commit themselves even to evil must spend eternity. They are those "Who lived with neither infamy nor praise." In our world, when so many fearful or cynical souls spend their time in negativism, we might turn back to Dante for robust wisdom—and for a vision of the condign punishment designed for do-nothings.

THE DOMINICAN CRISIS: OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT

(Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania (at the request of Mr. BANDSTRA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. speaker, while nearly all of us, as American citizens, live in hope that all peoples in all nations will one day be free, even at the cost of revolution against tyranny, we all too often find ourselves rooting for an underdog who has already been corrupted by the greatest tyranny in the world today—communism.

The headlines of this past weekend have told a tragic story of a bloody, confused and entangled revolt in the Dominican Republic. At first, before the facts had been gathered, it might have seemed almost like a replay of a dozen other coups which have clouded the history of the Caribbean and Latin America in general.

The facts have shown otherwise.

The young army generals, loyal to Juan Bosch, were swept from control of the rebelling elements. Today, it seems clear, the continued harassment and the sporadic outbreaks that have sabotaged all our early efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement are the work of skilled, Communist-trained insurgents.

Much has been written and said about this Nation's decision to intervene in the Dominican fighting. It has been con-

demned by those who say we have no business on the island at all. It has been praised by those who would have us carry our own role even further, becoming not only a protector and a persuader but an active combatant for the soul of the island and its people.

There is a middle ground in this debate, a ground upon which true patriotism and true reason can commune.

That ground is the foundation of America's role in all conflicts where the liberty and free will of a people are threatened—not just in those conflicts in which American property or citizens are threatened.

The commitment we have here is allied to our commitment in Europe and the Pacific in World War II, in Korea in the 1950's, in Vietnam this year and for nearly a decade past.

Our only alternative is to close up shop as an international power, to seal ourselves off from the world and its unfortunate problems, to cast aside the mantle of leadership handed down to us by those generations who, without total understanding of the greatness of their own role, were willing to fight to preserve this Nation and its strength.

What we have done in the Dominican Republic is a renewal of a pledge—a pledge to ourselves, our children and to those who live, as we do, in the prayerful faith that peace can, indeed, be made a reality.

No one, it seems to me, has summed up the case for our Dominican intervention better than the brilliant columnist and reporter, Charles Bartlett, whose comments on this issue appeared in last night's Washington Evening Star.

I consider it a privilege to call the attention of my colleagues to Mr. Bartlett's column and insert it as part of these proceedings:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, May 4, 1965]

THE CASE FOR DOMINICAN ACTION

(By Charles Bartlett)

Much of the liberal instinct to protest the American intervention in the Dominican Republic is being stifled by an awareness that President Johnson had no sound alternatives to the course he has followed.

The authentic leading South American liberals are largely silent in the chorus of protest. Johnson has taken great pains to make them understand that on the evening of April 27, the Dominican Republic was a power vacuum in which many lives were imperiled and many efficient, purposeful, and guerrilla-trained Communists were at work.

One proof of this vacuum will be found in the efforts of the coming days to piece together new leadership for the country. Even after the dust settles, this necessary leadership will be hard to find. An almost total lack of the caliber of men who make leaders is one tragic consequence of 31 years of brutal dictatorship.

Charges that the United States has resisted the return of Juan Bosch, the poet liberal whose incompetence as an administrator permitted his deposition in 1962, are unfounded. Bosch himself, through timidity or indecision, chose to stay in Puerto Rico instead of asserting himself in the chaos that his followers had created. His failure to take command will not strengthen his cause in the new era.

The Dominican generals, including Elias Wessin y Wessin, proved in the testing mo-

ments to have the clay feet of men who matured in a corrupt society. Since none of them rose to the occasion, some suspect the Dominicans may turn toward Joaquin Balaguer, the old man who remained as President immediately after the Trujillo assassination in 1961. He represents a compromise between the new taste for democracy and the old reliance on authority.

If there was no leader in Santo Domingo to whom Johnson could look confidently on the evening of April 27, there were several on whom he could look with concern. The postmortem debate on whether the Communists could have captured the Government, if the Marines had not landed has already begun. Fortunately the intelligence readings were excellent and they indicated in advance that the potential was there.

The ominous Communist asset was the training in guerrilla tactics that had been imparted in Cuba to at least 18 of the insurgents. In the fluid situation which prevailed in Santo Domingo, these paramilitary experts, led by a resourceful Spanish Communist named Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, had a splendid chance to prevail.

Criticisms of Johnson for resorting to gunboat diplomacy in these circumstances must be weighed against the private laments of many South American liberals in 1961 that President Kennedy did not snatch triumph from disaster at the Bay of Pigs by dispatching American soldiers to finish off Fidel Castro. Critics also must ponder the presumption of responsible Venezuelans and Bolivians that American troops will arrive, if all other hope is lost in chaos, to save their governments from the Communists.

The criticisms must be further weighted against the gratitude of Juan Bosch in mid-November of 1961 after American naval forces frustrated the return to the Dominican Republic of the wicked Trujillo uncles. Bosch hailed this fleet intervention, which stopped just short of Marine landings, as an act "that could save many lives and many troubles in the near future."

The little-known record of this country's dogged efforts since 1961 to implant democracy in the barren Dominican soil is one pledge of Washington's virtuous intentions. From the moment that Trujillo was killed, leading Dominicans have leaned heavily upon American guidance in the tricky transition from dictatorship. All the leverage of Washington's good offices has been applied to encourage constitutional government.

The break with the habits and attitudes of 31 years does not come easily. Henry Wells, a political scientist who helped to construct the machinery for the 1962 election, observed after the voting of a Dominican official that everything had gone smoothly. "These people are very well disciplined," the man responded.

The future will be no easier than the past in the Dominican Republic. One American policymaker said the decision to send Marines into Santo Domingo was "like arresting your mother." As the Communists try to make the most of the tender days ahead, this country's composure will rest upon its case that the decision was unavoidable.

BARING BILL TO REPEAL RETAILERS AND COMMUNICATIONS EXCISE TAXES

(Mr. BARING (at the request of Mr. BANDSTRA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BARING. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing two bills for the repeal of the Federal retailers excise taxes and the excise tax on amounts paid for communication service.

The President, in his state of the Union message made reference to a cut in excise taxes. In this regard I am in complete agreement with the President.

The retailers excise taxes were adopted in 1941 as an emergency tax during World War II. To continue this tax I feel inflicts irreparable damage to many small retailers and manufacturers.

Furthermore, the present retail excise tax structure is incongruous with our national tax philosophy. These levies are regressive, working the greatest hardship on those least able to pay, namely, those in the low income brackets.

In the case of the excise taxes on communications, we levied our first national excise tax on long distance telephone calls in 1932. The tax was extended and increased during World War II when such taxation served a dual purpose of producing revenue and reducing the load on our heavily burdened communications network.

Thirty-five years ago the telephone was perhaps a luxury. In most areas of our Nation, those were the days of the party line. Quite obviously, this is no longer true. Consumer savings on phone bills would pour new money into our economy.

No other utility service in the American home is taxed in this manner by the Federal Government. It is time we recognized a simple truth the American businessman and the consumer he serves have known for a long time, namely, that the telephone is not a luxury and should no longer be treated that way.

FIESTA SAN ANTONIO, 1965

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. BANDSTRA) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the most unique annual festival of any in America, in my opinion, is the Fiesta San Antonio, held each year in my hometown of San Antonio. The weeklong series of parades, galas, and festivities is widely celebrated as the most beautiful, joyous, and spectacular of its kind. It includes the "Battle of Flowers," a parade of floats decorated by flowers which is indescribably magnificent and which is a worthy herald of the new spring season. The Fiesta Flambeau is a spectacular night parade and is undoubtedly the greatest illuminated parade in the world.

Fiesta San Antonio is a wonderful example of the blended Latin and Anglo cultures which has been accomplished in the Alamo City. The city itself is situated on the ancient Camino Real, the Kings Highway, which existed before Texas was a sovereign Republic or a State.

The fiesta begins each year with the traditional and historic pilgrimage to the Alamo where ceremonies are conducted formally opening the week of festivities. This year, Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier, commanding general, 4th U.S. Army, delivered the pilgrimage address. With unanimous consent I am inserting this patriotic and inspiring speech in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

PILGRIMAGE ADDRESS AT THE ALAMO, APRIL 19, 1965, LT. GEN. ROBERT W. COLGLAZIER, JR., U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING GENERAL, 4TH U.S. ARMY

It has been many years since my initial participation in San Antonio's fiesta. Even before that I became imbued with the sincerest respect and deep reverence which all Texans have for this, their most historic shrine.

The details of the great drama which unfolded at the Alamo, and the worldwide significance of absolute heroism displayed here in 1836, have remained ingrained in my memory. Who, having been here once, could ever forget?

Thus, it is a great personal honor to have been selected to make this traditional address, and to join with you again in paying tribute to those heroes who fell here and to the equally heroic Texans at San Jacinto who vindicated the sacrifices made at the Alamo.

Those assembled at the Alamo on that fateful day nearly 130 years ago came from many widely scattered areas of the world. Most of them were from States of the Union, but many came from foreign lands. They joined with the Texans in one of the world's greatest recorded efforts to win and preserve freedom. All—all of them—native and adopted Texan alike—showed the world they preferred a valiant death to the ignominy of oppression and tyranny.

Col. William B. Travis addressed to the people of Texas, and to all Americans, what has been called "the most heroic document in American history."

He wrote, in part: "I have sustained a continual bombardment and cannonade for 24 hours, and have not lost a man. The enemy has demanded a surrender at discretion, otherwise the garrison are to be put to the sword, if the fort is taken."

"I have answered the demand with a cannon shot and our flag still waves proudly from the walls. I shall never surrender or retreat. I am determined to sustain myself as long as possible, and die like a soldier, who never forgets what is due to his own honor and that of his country. Victory or death."

Today, this struggle against oppression and tyranny is still being waged by men who are willing to make the supreme sacrifice to insure that freedom will live and progress through future years.

In keeping with that gathering, over a century ago, of heroic fighting men, valiant Texans of today are joined with other guardians of freedom throughout the world—on the alert, with weapons at the ready. They are prepared to continue the struggle against despotism whenever and wherever called upon to do so.

Indeed, these Texans are laying their lives on the line in one remote, but very important area of the world—the Republic of Vietnam. Some have made the ultimate sacrifice in the battle against oppression there. It has been my sad but proud responsibility, in less than 1 year since assuming command of the 4th U.S. Army, to present a number of medals to families whose heroic husbands and sons have died in the steaming jungles or the marshy rice fields of that faraway Asian country. These sons of Texas echo, by deeds, Colonel Travis' determination never to surrender or retreat.

This determination to resist, to die for our country, for our ideals, and for our honor is the "spirit of the Alamo." And this spirit of dedication and determination never has faltered. Your husbands, sons and brothers displayed it in the fighting of World War II at Salerno, Guadalcanal, the Rapido River and in Normandy—and on Pork Chop Hill and the Pusan Perimeter in Korea as well as countless other battles since the siege of the Alamo.

The "spirit of the Alamo" cannot be attained by decree; it cannot be ordained. It

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ent. It would be a burden to the low-income recipient if other elements were included and these were not.

In some hospitals the fee for specialist services (radiologist, pathologist) are included in the price of the particular procedure. To separate these items in each case would be an additional bookkeeping problem. However, the problem would be the additional amount of accounts written off as bad debts. It is not proper to withhold reimbursement for services rendered, including the services of specialist if this is the existing financial arrangement between the hospital and specialist. Otherwise it is proper that the specialist make an application for him to be reimbursed separately for his charges to the patient.

Thank you again for your actions in this vital area of health care.

Yours truly,

SISTER FRIEDEGARD,
Administrator.

CHRISTIAN WELFARE HOSPITAL,
East St. Louis, Ill., April 13, 1965.

Hon. PAUL H. DOUGLAS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DOUGLAS: Assuming the probability of passage of the medicare bill which you remarked upon on March 29; I feel your insight into the effect of exclusion of medical specialists from payment under the bill and your effort to amend this exclusion is in the interest of the Nation's hospitals and the public which uses them.

I cannot see the logic of excluding these services from enjoying payment under the public phase of the bill providing for care of the elderly when, as you have pointed out, the payment of such costs has been accepted under preexisting programs for care to public indigents and Armed Forces dependents, as well as, Blue Cross and private insurance plans.

Your action to remedy this obvious error will be appreciated. I enclose a copy of a recent communication from the American Protestant Hospital Association pertaining to the subject.

Very truly yours,

DANIEL A. HICKS,
Administrator.

MERCY HOSPITAL,
Chicago, Ill., April 13, 1965.

Hon. PAUL H. DOUGLAS,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: After carefully reviewing the comments as appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 29, 1965, we are heartily in agreement with your conclusions and feel very strongly as you do that if the services are taken out of the hospital reimbursement cost contracts, this will have an inflationary effect on the total cost of medical care. It will tend to create an almost unsurmountable technical difficulty in handling billings by the hospital to the patients.

If we may be of any assistance please contact us.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT F. SCHINDERLE,
Assistant Administrator.

AMERICAN PROTESTANT
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
Chicago, Ill., March 25, 1965.

EDWIN L. CROSBY, M.D.,
Director, American Hospital Association,
Chicago, Ill.

DEAR DR. CROSBY: The board of trustees of the American Protestant Hospital Association meeting in Chicago on March 24 reviewed the memorandum titled "The King-Anderson Bill" released by the AHA on March 10, 1965.

The board of trustees reaffirmed the position taken by the house of delegates on January 18, 1965, supporting the effort of the AHA toward adequate legislation to provide adequate care for the aging.

The board of trustees also lends its support to the position taken by the AHA relative to: (1) acceptance of AHA acting in behalf of hospitals, (2) the designation of the National Blue Cross Association as the hospitals' administrative intermediary, and (3) that pathology, radiology, physiatry and anesthesiology services continue to be included in determining hospital costs.

This action by the board of trustees will be transmitted to all APHA institutional member hospitals and you are herewith authorized to use this statement in any manner best suited to strengthen this important legislation.

Very truly yours,

LEO M. LYONS,
Executive Director.

THE COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF EVANSTON,
Evanston, Ill., April 12, 1965.

Hon. PAUL H. DOUGLAS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: The trustees and administration of Community Hospital of Evanston endorses your position with reference to the removal of costs of radiologists, pathologists, physiatrists, and anesthesiologists as benefits in the basic hospitalization plan of the current medicare bill.

We feel that the bill in its present form would have a precedent-setting effect on hospitals and cause a drastic inflation in hospital economics as an estimated 25 percent of hospital billings in the State of Illinois reflect the services of these staff specialists.

We urge your continued action to remove this unwarranted amendment.

Sincerely yours,

STEPHEN E. DORN,
Administrator.

ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL,
Kankakee, Ill., April 12, 1965.

Senator PAUL H. DOUGLAS,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DOUGLAS: Failure to include customary billings in pathology, radiology, anesthesiology, and physiatry in the amended medicare package will have a drastic effect on hospital economics.

Please push your efforts to get these services back into the bill as hospital benefits.

An estimated 25 percent of hospital billings in Illinois comes from staff specialist departments.

Sincerely,

Sister MARY ANSELM,
Administrator.

JACKSON PARK HOSPITAL,
Chicago, Ill., April 12, 1965.

Senator PAUL H. DOUGLAS,
Congress of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR DOUGLAS: With regard to your letter of April 2, I wish to state that I agree wholeheartedly with the points brought out in your speech in the Senate. If the House bill is not changed, I am afraid that most patients will receive bills from the hospital, surgeon, referring physician, radiologist, pathologist, anesthesiologist, perhaps a cardiologist, and physiatrist. There is no question but that receiving seven or eight bills instead of two or three will create chaos, and will have an inflationary effect on the cost of hospital care.

Very truly yours,

MOSE ELLIS,
Administrator.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF RESOLUTION

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the names of the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE] and the junior Senator from

California [Mr. MURPHY] may be added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 83, to create a select committee to study gold production in the United States, at its next printing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION

Under authority of the orders of the Senate, as indicated below, the following names have been added as additional cosponsors for the following bills and joint resolution:

Authority of April 22, 1965:

S. 1797. A bill to amend the Davis-Bacon Act to extend its application to contracts for the maintenance of Federal installations: Mr. CASE, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. PROUTY, and Mr. SCOTT.

Authority of April 29, 1965:

S. 1851. A bill to provide fellowships for research leading to a doctoral degree: Mr. CANNON, and Mr. LONG of Missouri.

Authority of April 30, 1965:

S. 1861. A bill to provide additional assistance for areas suffering a major disaster: Mr. CLARK, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. MCGEE, Mrs. NEUBERGER, and Mr. YARBOROUGH.

S. 1864. A bill to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938, as amended, to provide for minimum wages for certain persons employed in agriculture, and for other purposes: Mr. GRUENING, and Mrs. NEUBERGER.

S. 1865. A bill to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend the child labor provisions thereof to certain children employed in agriculture, and for other purposes: Mr. GRUENING, and Mr. HART.

S. 1866. A bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, so as to make its provisions applicable to agriculture: Mr. GRUENING, and Mrs. NEUBERGER.

S. 1867. A bill to amend the Act of June 6, 1933, as amended, to authorize the Secretary of Labor to develop and maintain improved, voluntary methods of recruiting, training, transporting, and distributing agricultural workers, and for other purposes: Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HART, and Mrs. NEUBERGER.

S. 1868. A bill to provide for the establishment of a Council to be known as the "National Advisory Council on Migratory Labor": Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HART, and Mrs. NEUBERGER.

S. 1869. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to encourage the construction of housing facilities for agricultural workers by permitting the amortization over a 60-month period of the cost, or a portion of the cost, of constructing such housing facilities: Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HART, and Mrs. NEUBERGER.

S.J. Res. 75. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to residence and physical presence requirements for voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections and for voting in elections for U.S. Senator and Members of the House of Representatives: Mr. GRUENING, and Mrs. NEUBERGER.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON THE PLANNING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I wish to announce that the committee will hold an open hearing on Tuesday, May 11, 1965, at 10 a.m. in Room 4221, New Senate Office Building, on Senate Concurrent Resolution 32, the "Planning for Peace Resolution," introduced by Senator CLARK for himself and other Senators.

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All those wishing to present testimony are requested to make arrangements with the chief clerk of the committee.

**NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON S. 1817,
TO AMEND THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
LAW TO CLARIFY THE CATE-
GORIES OF FEDERALLY AIDED
ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS**

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, as chairman of the Public Health, Education, Welfare, and Safety Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, I announce that my subcommittee will conduct public hearings on S. 1817, Monday, May 10, 1965, at 10 a.m. in room 6226, New Senate Office Building.

The bill to which I just referred was introduced by our distinguished colleague, Senator RIBICOFF. It would amend the District of Columbia public assistance law to clarify the categories of federally aided assistance recipients. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 1817

A bill to amend the District of Columbia public assistance law to clarify the categories of federally aided assistance recipients

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, effective July 1, 1965, section 3(a) of the District of Columbia Public Assistance Act of 1942 (section 3-202(a), District of Columbia Code) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "The categories listed in clauses (1), (2), (3), and (4) hereof shall include aid or assistance for at least all individuals with respect to whom Federal payments are authorized by title I (other than so much thereof as relates to medical assistance for the aged), IV, X, and XIV of the Social Security Act."

**ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE AP-
PENDIX**

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. THURMOND:

Editorial entitled "Bank Merger Confusion," published in the Orangeburg (S.C.) Times and Democrat of May 2, 1965.

By Mr. MORTON:

Editorial on the Tower substitute for the voting rights bill, published in the Dallas Morning News of April 30, 1965.

By Mr. TYDINGS:

Article entitled "1,400 Seeking a Better Future for Annapolis," written by J. William Joynes, and published in the Baltimore News-American of April 18, 1965.

DOMINICAN LANDING NECESSARY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is in order.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to proceed for the next 7 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the action which President Johnson has taken in dispatching American troops to the Dominican Republic is, in my judgment, a laudable move to safeguard the vital interests of the United States in the Caribbean.

Little more than 2 years ago, the government of Fidel Castro invited the Soviet Union to convert the island of Cuba into a Russian missile base. The crisis thus created, and the mailed-fist response of President Kennedy, brought the world to the verge of nuclear war, in a showdown no one would want to experience again. The elemental right to self-preservation would, in itself, justify an American intervention in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the forcible establishment of another Castro-type regime. The waters of the Caribbean wash our southern shores. We have urgent and immediate interests at stake there.

I do not know whether the revolt against the junta government in Santo Domingo, which broke out a week ago, was in fact taken over by the Communists. The evidence is not yet sufficiently complete for anyone to know this with certainty. But the evidence does reveal, indisputably, that Communist elements were actively involved in the uprising, and that there was a clear and present danger of a Communist seizure of power. The swift action of the President has foreclosed such a calamity. For this, he is to be strongly commended.

The intervention of American troops was made necessary, in the first instance, to protect the lives of American citizens, and to provide for their evacuation. A total breakdown of law and order had occurred in Santo Domingo, which made a rescue mission mandatory, for humanitarian reasons alone. Other foreign nationals have also received the cloak of American protection.

As a Senator, representing the sovereign people of Idaho, I do not conceive it to be my duty to "rubber stamp" every action the President may take in the field of foreign policy, even though, as a Democrat, he heads up the administration to which I give my general support. I have criticized certain aspects of our policy in Vietnam, and I will continue to speak up whenever I think our course may be wrong. This is an obligation of my office which transcends party allegiance or any consideration of political risk.

By the same token, I will commend the President whenever he takes action abroad which seems to me to be well suited to advance the interests of our country. His initiative in the Dominican Republic is a venture well begun, for which he deserves the strongest praise.

I say this, deeply conscious of the fact that the Dominican Republic is neither our possession nor our protectorate. The people of that unhappy island are the citizens of an independent country. As such, they have the right to form a government of their own choice. We insist upon the right of self-determination for ourselves, so we cannot deny it to others.

Having interposed our own troops, the revolution in the Dominican Republic has been quelled. We have thus assumed

a responsibility toward the Dominican people which we must now faithfully discharge. Part of that responsibility is to see to it that a cease-fire is achieved, a provisional government agreed to, and order restored. But more than this, the essential need will be to insure the holding of free elections, as quickly as possible, so that the citizens of the Dominican Republic may properly form their own government.

Let those who raise the cry "gunboat diplomacy" remember that there is nothing yet to lament. The rights of the Dominican people have not been usurped. Our intervention found them caught between the horns of two tyrannies. Neither their previous government, a military junta imposed by force, nor a Communist government, seizing power at the hands of a small band of hardcore revolutionaries, could possibly represent the choice, freely given, of the majority of the Dominicans. We must remember that Castro's government has not yet permitted free elections in Cuba, and never will.

So it is that Lyndon Johnson, through prompt and timely intervention, has grasped an opportunity to restore to the people of the Dominican Republic their fundamental right to self-determination. The President has said that his purpose will be the bringing about of free elections. He has no intention of keeping American marines on the island for any extended length of time.

If the end result of our occupation of Santo Domingo is the imposition of another military junta, then will be the time to protest the revival of gunboat diplomacy. As of now, we have every reason to applaud the President, and to hope his decisive leadership may lead to a new birth of freedom for the oppressed people of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, on May 4, the Washington Post published an excellent editorial concerning the situation in the Dominican Republic. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
May 4, 1965]

INTERVENTION POLICY

There is a great deal of merit in the assertion of Juan Bosch that the United States, by its intervention in the Dominican Republic, has assumed responsibility for bringing democracy to the country. Certainly, we cannot now calmly withdraw our military forces and leave the powers of government to be picked up by any candidate for authority who happens to be in possession of essential military force.

History, as Lord Acton pointed out, does not disclose its alternatives, and no one ever can know whether the democratic forces acting in Bosch's name would have succeeded in controlling the uprising against the military regime. It is this unknown and unascertainable fact on which the wisdom or unwisdom of the President's determination to intervene depends. If the Dominican intervention is to be a precedent for further intervention of the kind, we are embarked upon a policy that will involve us in repeated operations of this sort. If the suspicion of Communist participation in a popular uprising against a military dictatorship is suffi-

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cient to trigger the use of American Armed Forces we are going to be busy in Latin America.

Every country in which there exists a government that did not arrive at power by democratic means is a logical target for overthrow by popular forces. And every popular force is the logical object for an effort by Communists to dominate its leadership. It does not take much prescience to forecast, sooner or later, an effort to overthrow the arbitrary government in Haiti. And it does not take a gift of prophecy to foresee that the Communists will be in the thick of that revolutionary effort. And if the new Johnson doctrine persists, the U.S. Armed Forces will be on hand within hours after the initial uprising. It is an ominous outlook. This may bear little resemblance in purpose to the interventionist policies of the twenties, but the methods of carrying out the policy are too much alike totally to escape the same sort of criticism and reproach.

It is perfectly evident, at the same time, that the traditional devices for collective action are totally inadequate to protect the hemisphere against the new sort of Communist conquest. The OAS Charter sets up a solid wall against the use of military force of a conventional kind across national boundaries. Respect for this barrier only guarantees the unconventional Communist invaders, who penetrate clandestinely and covertly, immunity against any outside check on their subversion. The old-fashioned effort to guarantee national territorial integrity is thus transformed into a device to allow the Communist overthrow of South American governments. As long as the rest of the region is committed to stand aside, in the presence of Communist aggression, the hemisphere faces the melancholy prospect of successful Communist operations of three sorts: Communist aggression by action against or infiltration of a popularly elected constitutional regime, by revolt against a military dictatorship, or by penetration of a popular revolutionary movement.

The President has stated flatly that "the American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." If this is indeed the collective purpose of "the American nations" they have not perfected the political or military means of achieving that purpose. Until they do so, the United States stands committed to more extensive national obligations than it has hitherto assumed in this hemisphere. The emergency in the Dominican Republic has led us to improvise to fit our practice a policy that has not had the benefit of psychological, legal, political, or military preparation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business?

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DESIGNATION OF NEZ PERCE NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK, IDAHO

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 60.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair) laid before the Senate the amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 60) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to designate the Nez Perce National Historical Park in the State of Idaho, and for other purposes, which was, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That it is the purpose of this Act to facilitate protection and provide interpretation of sites in the Nez Perce country of Idaho that have exceptional value in commemorating the history of the Nation.

Sec. 2. To implement this purpose the Secretary of the Interior may designate as the Nez Perce National Historical Park various component sites in Federal and non-Federal ownership relating to the early Nez Perce culture, the Lewis and Clark Expedition through the area, the fur trade, missionaries, gold mining and logging, the Nez Perce war of 1877, and such other sites as he finds will depict the role of the Nez Perce country in the westward expansion of the Nation.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Interior may acquire by donation or with donated funds such lands, or interests therein, and other property which in his judgment will further the purpose of this Act and he may purchase with appropriated funds land, or interests therein, required for the administration of the Nez Perce National Historical Park: *Provided*, That he may purchase no more than one thousand five hundred acres in fee, and no more than one thousand five hundred acres in scenic easements. The Nez Perce Tribe's governing body, if it so desires, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, is authorized to sell, donate, or exchange tribal-owned lands held in trust needed to further the purpose of this Act.

Sec. 4. (a) Indian trust land may be designated by the Secretary of the Interior for inclusion in the Nez Perce National Historical Park with the concurrence of the beneficial owner. Sites in Federal ownership under the administrative jurisdiction of other Government agencies may likewise be designated by the Secretary of the Interior for inclusion in the Nez Perce National Historical Park with the concurrence of the agency having administrative responsibility therefor, but such designation shall effect no transfer of administrative control unless the administering agency consents thereto. Not more than one thousand and five hundred acres overall shall be designated pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this subsection. The Secretary of the Interior may cooperate with the Nez Perce Tribe or the administering agency, as the case may be, in research into and interpretation of the significance of any site so designated and in providing desirable interpretive services and facilities and other facilities required for public access to and use and enjoyment of the site and in conservation of the scenic and other resources thereof.

(b) The Secretary of the Interior may enter into cooperative agreements with the owners of property which, under the provisions of this Act, may be designated for inclusion in Nez Perce National Historical Park as sites in non-Federal ownership, and he may assist in the preservation, renewal, and interpretation of the properties, provided the cooperative agreements shall contain, but not be limited to, provisions that: (1) the Secretary has right of access at all reasonable times to all public portions of the property for the purpose of conducting visitors through the property and interpreting it to the public, and (2) no changes or alterations shall be made in the properties, including buildings and grounds, without the written consent of the Secretary.

Sec. 5. When the Secretary of the Interior determines that he has acquired title to, or

interest in, sufficient properties or determines that he has entered into appropriate cooperative agreements with owners of non-Federal properties, or any combination thereof including the designation of sites already in Federal ownership, he shall by publication in the Federal Register establish the Nez Perce National Historical Park and thereafter administer the Federal property under his administrative jurisdiction in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented.

Sec. 6. (a) In order to carry out the purpose of this Act the Secretary of the Interior may contract and make cooperative agreements with the State of Idaho, its political subdivisions or agencies, corporations, associations, the Nez Perce Tribe, or individuals, to protect, preserve, maintain, or operate any site, object, or property included within the Nez Perce National Historical Park, regardless of whether title thereto is in the United States: *Provided*, That no contract or cooperative agreement shall be made or entered into which will obligate the general fund of the Treasury unless or until Congress has appropriated money for such purpose.

(b) To facilitate the interpretation of the Nez Perce country the Secretary is authorized to erect and maintain tablets or markers in accordance with the provisions contained in the Act approved August 21, 1935, entitled "An Act to provide for the preservation of historic American sites, buildings, objects, and antiquities of national significance, and for other purposes" (49 Stat. 666).

Sec. 7. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated the sums of not more than \$630,000 for the acquisition of lands and interests in land and not more than \$1,337,000 for construction, restoration work, and other improvements at the Nez Perce National Historical Park under this Act.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendment of the House.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

BANKRUPTCIES INVOLVED IN FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION INSURED MORTGAGES

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, on previous occasions I have urged the Senate to give attention to the manner in which the Federal Housing Administration is insuring mortgages on what should have been recognized as unsound multifamily housing projects.

The wholesale manner in which these multimillion-dollar projects have been approved in the past few years and the wholesale manner in which they are going broke, oftentimes before they are completed, represents an enormous and unnecessary cost to the taxpayers.

Today I list seven more multifamily projects in the Florida area upon which the Federal Housing Administration has guaranteed mortgages aggregating \$21,742,700. Total payments of only \$125,664.35 were ever made on these seven

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mortgages. Then with over \$21½ million still due the projects went into default, and the Government is now being forced to take them over under foreclosure proceedings.

As this program is presently being administered the sponsors are allowed to incorporate each of these projects as a separate corporate entity, and when one projects fails the sponsors individually are not held responsible for the payment of the mortgage nor does the Government have any claim on any other project which the same sponsor may be operating successfully either with or without a Government loan.

This means that the Government takes 100 percent of all the risk and the sponsors can sit back with 100 percent of all the profits, resulting in everyone having a field day at the taxpayers' expense.

One major weakness in this program is the failure of the Federal Housing Administration to check the actual cost of the land and construction before insuring the mortgage. Likewise, the manner in which the sponsors contract with their own construction firms opens the possibility of abuse unless carefully checked.

The Federal Housing Administration heretofore has not been making any special effort to determine the actual cost of the land upon which these projects were being built but rather has been using an appraised valuation as a formula upon which to base the mortgage, with the result that, as I pointed out in my remarks of April 22, in many instances the sponsors started out with a substantial cash profit.

Recently the Commissioner has advised that this procedure is being changed and that consideration will be given to the actual cost factor, but this procedure should be an ironclad rule.

The seven projects to which I refer today are as follows:

Mandalay Shores, Inc., Clearwater, Fla.: On November 23, 1960, the Federal Housing Administration made a commitment to insure a mortgage of \$7,170,900 on this project. After payments of only \$8,964 had been made toward the reduction in the principal, this mortgage in April 1964 was in default and assigned to the Federal Housing Administration for foreclosure. Foreclosure sale is scheduled for May 12, 1965.

Coral Crest Apartments, Inc., Tampa, Fla.: On July 1, 1960, the Federal Housing Administration insured a mortgage of \$1,382,000 on this project. After payments of only \$8,650.35 on the principal, this mortgage on January 2, 1964, went into default, and the Federal Housing Administration foreclosed on March 2, 1965.

Pasadena Apartments, Inc., South Pasadena, Fla.: On December 30, 1960, the Federal Housing Administration insured a mortgage of \$3,377,700 on this project. After payments of only \$1,513 on the principal, this mortgage on November 22, 1963, defaulted, and the Federal Housing Administration foreclosed on December 22, 1964.

Horizon House, Clearwater, Fla.: On March 16, 1961, the Federal Housing Administration insured a mortgage of \$2,

828,500 on this project. With no payments having been made toward a reduction in the principal, this mortgage on November 22, 1963, was assigned to the Federal Housing Administration.

Indian Pass Apartments, Inc., Indian Rocks, Fla.: On April 11, 1960, the Federal Housing Administration insured a mortgage of \$1,806,700 on this project. After payments of only \$5,593 had been made toward a reduction in the principal, this mortgage on December 2, 1962, was in default, and the Federal Housing Administration foreclosed on November 4, 1964.

Paradise Island Towers, St. Petersburg, Fla.: On November 15, 1961, the Federal Housing Administration insured a mortgage of \$3,090,700 on this project. After payments of only \$24,144 had been made toward a reduction in the principal, on March 11, 1965, the Federal Housing Administration accepted a deed in lieu of foreclosure.

Southgate Towers, Inc., St. Petersburg, Fla.: On September 29, 1960, the Federal Housing Administration agreed to insure a mortgage of \$2,086,200 on this project. After payments of \$73,800 had been made toward a reduction in the principal, this mortgage on December 19, 1962, was in default, and the Federal Housing Administration on December 2, 1964, foreclosed.

I ask unanimous consent that the more detailed reports on each of these projects, including names and addresses of the sponsors, and so forth, as furnished by the Federal Housing Administration, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the reports were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

I

Mandalay Shores, Inc., project No. 067-00016 (rental housing), Clearwater, Fla.:

1. Feasibility date: September 4, 1959; commitment date: November 23, 1960; cost certification: April 3, 1963, \$8,037,222.

2(a). See covering letter.

2(b). Sponsor: Dworman Associates, 65 West 55th Street, New York, N.Y.

Mortgagor: Dworman Associates. Officers: Alvin Dworman, president, 155 East 76th Street, New York, N.Y.; Lester D. Dworman, vice president, 11 East 81st Street, New York, N.Y.; Darryl Dworman, secretary-treasurer, 170 East 83d Street, New York, N.Y. Stockholders: Alvin Dworman, Lester D. Dworman, Darryl Dworman, Abraham A. Rosen (care of Dworman Associates), Abraham Kamber (care of Dworman Associates).

3. Final endorsement: April 3, 1963; mortgage amount: \$7,170,900; payments in reduction to principal: \$8,964; status: Mortgage assigned to FHA April 1964. Referred to Department of Justice for foreclosure May 1964. Foreclosure sale scheduled for May 12, 1965.

II

Coral Crest Apartments, Inc., project No. 067-30073; Tampa, Fla.:

The application for this project was originally filed under section 207 rental housing. The sponsor then applied for and received a superseding commitment to insure under section 213 cooperative housing, the mortgage to be insured upon completion of the project. Following completion and insurance of the mortgage the sponsors were unsuccessful in the formation of the cooperative and were given permission to convert the project to a rental status.

1. Feasibility date: June 23, 1959; commitment date: July 1, 1960; cost certification: February 23, 1962, \$1,596,698.

2(a). See covering letter.

2(b). Sponsor: O. W. Foster, 4251 Henderson Boulevard, Tampa, Fla.

Mortgagor: Coral Crest Apartments, Inc., 214 West Gaston Street, Greensboro, N.C. Officers: W. H. Weaver, president, 602 Healey Building, Atlanta, Ga.; Abe M. Nail, Jr., vice president, Post Office Box 3054, Greensboro, N.C.; Lee P. Fore, vice president (no address shown); H. M. Weaver, treasurer (no address shown); Irene Karas, secretary (no address shown). Stockholders: W. H. Weaver (see above), Sonja R. Weaver (no address shown), Edith H. Weaver (no address shown), Lee P. Fore (no address shown).

3. Final endorsement: February 23, 1962; mortgage amount: \$1,382,000; payments in reduction to principal: \$8,650.35; status: Mortgage assigned to FHA January 2, 1964. Foreclosed March 2, 1965.

4. Project has not been resold.

III

Pasadena Apartments, Inc., project No. 067-30071 (cooperative housing); South Pasadena, Fla.:

1. Feasibility date: July 8, 1960; commitment date: December 30, 1960; cost certification: February 27, 1963, \$3,913,765.89.

2(a). See covering letter.

2(b). Sponsor: R. E. Clarson, 1930 13th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Fla.; R. E. Clarson, Jr., 1930 13th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Fla.; W. B. Wood, 1930 13th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Fla.; Robert C. Pelham, 3409 Wilder Lane, Orlando, Fla.; Hugo R. Broleman, 1212 East Colonial Drive, Orlando, Fla.

Mortgagor: Pasadena Apartments, Inc. Officers and directors: Robert C. Pelham, president; R. E. Clarson, vice president; W. B. Wood, treasurer; J. C. Dew, secretary, Florida Bank Building, St. Petersburg, Fla.; Lawrence R. Warrick, assistant secretary, 670 Fairbanks Avenue, Winter Park, Fla.; Hugo R. Broleman.

3. Final endorsement: February 27, 1963; mortgage amount: \$3,377,700; payments in reduction to principal: \$4,513; status: Mortgage assigned to FHA November 22, 1963. Foreclosed December 22, 1964.

4. Project has not been resold.

IV

Horizon House, project No. 067-30078-INV; Clearwater, Fla.:

1. Feasibility date: July 29, 1960; commitment date: March 16, 1961; cost certification: July 23, 1963, \$3,257,737.10.

2(a). See covering letter.

2(b). Sponsor: Robert Chuckrow, 60 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y.; Murray Smith, 150 Draper Lane, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.; Milton Hecht, 87 Lefferts Road, Yonkers, N.Y.; Henry Schneider, 235 75th Street, North Bergen, N.J.; Alvin Parker, 2 Cooper Road, New York, N.Y.

Mortgagor: Horizon House, Inc. Officers: Robert Chuckrow, president; Murray Smith, vice president; Louis S. Weiner, secretary; Milton Hecht, treasurer.

3. Finally endorsed: July 30, 1963; mortgage amount: \$2,828,500; payments in reduction to principal: None. Status: Mortgage assigned to FHA November 22, 1963. One hundred of the one hundred and twenty-five units are occupied by cooperative subscribers and the sponsors are attempting to arrange sale of the project to the cooperative.

V

Indian Pass Apartments, Inc., project No. 067-30070 (cooperative housing), Indian Rocks, Fla.:

1. Feasibility date: February 12, 1960; commitment date: April 11, 1960; cost certification: August 14, 1961, \$2,137,677.21.

2(a). See covering letter.

2(b). Sponsor: J. Hilbert Sapp, 801 Seville Place, Orlando, Fla.; Robert C. Pelham, 3409